Adam Watson (00:00)
Welcome back to “Simplifying the State,” the podcast where we break down politics so you don’t have to try and figure out why Syria’s GDP dropped by 50% in two years. As always, I’m Adam Watson.
Nicholas Perrin (00:12)
And I’m Nicholas Perrin.
Adam Watson (00:14)
All right, now before we start, if you would be so kind as to rate us, follow the show wherever you are listening, and share it with a friend or just some random person you see at your coffee shop.
OK, now for those of you who haven’t been watching the news since 2011, Syria has been in a little bit of a tumultuous situation. They have had a more than decade-long civil war, mostly between pro-Assad forces, Kurdish forces, and a handful of rebel pockets in the northwest—some in the south, but mainly in the north.
But if you had been following the Syrian situation since 2011 but stopped in early December last year, you quit following the news at the wrong time because in December 2024, the Assad regime fell after 54 years in power.
This came after a surprise rebel blitz to Damascus. The speed at which the regime fell was met with much surprise in Syria—by the rebels, by the Assad regime, and by basically everyone around the world. Many analysts attribute this to a multitude of factors, including the mass scaling back of Russian support as a result of their war in Ukraine.
I’m going to give a brief history of the Syrian civil war, and then Nicholas is going to talk about what the future for them could look like.
It started after Assad forces fired on peaceful protesters during the Arab Spring. That was a period in which multiple Middle Eastern countries saw attempts at overthrow or mass protests against oppressive governments.
After Assad forces fired on the protesters, that began the civil war. Now, the war had not just the rebel forces, the Kurdish forces, and the pro-Assad forces; there were a multitude of backers on each side and third-party actors.
Basically, to break it down: Iran and the Shia countries in the Middle East mostly supported Assad and his group. Most of the Sunni countries, as well as the United States, lent either material support or—in the case of the United States—mostly CIA-backed operations to train and support the rebel groups. But this mostly came on the condition that the rebel groups would only fight ISIS, which established itself in the chaos of the Syrian civil war.
In addition to the Iranians who supported the Syrian regime, they also received support from Vladimir Putin and Russia, with the Russians mostly providing air support, some officers and weapons, but predominantly air support.
The status quo kind of remained the same until about 2017, when Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons on his population for the second time. Following this, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered attacks on Syrian military bases, specifically air bases that were used by planes attacking both rebel forces and dropping chemical weapons on the population.
Then the status quo again mostly remained the same. There were some skirmishes. But one point of contention among the backers was between Turkey and the Kurdish forces. For those who do not know, Turkey has a pretty tumultuous relationship with the Kurds.
This resulted in Turkey firing on and attacking various Kurdish forces despite also arming the anti-Assad groups in the north, which pushed to Damascus, overthrowing Bashar al-Assad.
Now, getting to the fall of the Assad regime, which started in November 2024: The anti-Assad forces conducted an attack on Aleppo, a fairly large city in Syria on the coast. They captured it within three days, going both over the ground and under the ground using tunnels they had constructed.
After they faced no real counterattack from the Assad forces, they decided to continue with their attack and take more land from Assad until they eventually reached Damascus, where Assad then fled to Russia and essentially lost the civil war.
Nicholas, do you want to talk about where the situation in Syria could possibly go now?
Nicholas Perrin (04:51)
Yeah, I can do that. Ever since the fall of the Assad regime, the new Syrian government has been doing fairly well, better than most analysts had expected. Some parts have left people disappointed. For example, the adoption of the new flag of Syria is similar to that of other Arab countries, indicating that it might not be as secular as had previously been hoped.
Other than that, it’s doing fairly well for itself. When the rebel leader of Syria, Ahmad al-Sharah, took power and introduced a “caretaker government,” there was still notable violence in Syria.
Most notably, on the west coast of Syria, 1,500 people were reportedly killed by the new government’s soldiers and people who worked under it. That upset many people, notably Western countries that had previously been sympathetic to the government and still were, but less so, worried it could become another Assad.
That tension passed. Only a few months ago, Western countries like the U.K. and U.S. lifted sanctions previously held on Syria. Relations have been pretty good with Turkey, the main backer of those rebels, because Turkey was happy to see they’d succeeded and were good allies now.
Although things have not been all rosy between the two, it has to do with Kurdistan. In northeastern Syria, there was a state known as Rojava, backed by the U.S. It was mostly Kurdish-controlled and had a constitution noting freedom and equality for all. It was basically the United States of the Middle East, if that makes sense.
Most of the population were Kurds, which made Turkey upset. Turkey has had many issues with Kurdish resistance groups in its southeast because of poor economic conditions, Kurdish nationalism, and Turkish refusals to compromise. The agreement between Syria and Rojava guaranteeing autonomy for Rojava inspired further Kurdish protests and demands, which is why Turkey was annoyed.
Rojava only wanted to become part of Syria again. They had no intentions of independence. The only thing they wanted was a decentralized Syria, so something like Assad could never happen again.
Early on, negotiations between the Syrian government and Rojava went very well. They were able to form an agreement in which the Rojavan state would be dissolved and become a part of Syria. Even though that’s happened, there’s still some discomfort and resistance in Rojava because they’re worried about the increased centralization of the Syrian state. That issue hasn’t really been resolved.
Looking south to the Golan Heights—a mountain range in the south of Syria—early on after the fall of Assad, Israel pushed into the Golan Heights and took key areas. This is internationally recognized Syrian territory.
Israel’s justification was three things:
- To protect against potential Syrian invasion, because they were worried about Turkish support and pressure on Syria.
- To dismantle chemical weapons plants previously used by the Assad government.
- To protect the Druze minority, mostly concentrated in southern Syria and northeastern Israel.
Because of this, Turkey was even more annoyed at Israel than normal and continued to support Syria. It also made Syria feel more pressure, which could be a reason for its attempts at centralization. A centralized government is better at defending against outward aggression than a decentralized one.
Although there was a cease-fire to end the Israeli invasion, new conflicts have emerged after Israeli airstrikes in Syria killed six soldiers, sparking fighting. That’s happened continuously since the fall of the Assad regime.
Because Syria’s economy fell by 50% in the past couple of years, Saudi Arabia decided to invest $6.4 billion into Syria to help with diplomatic ties and economic development. Most Muslim countries in the Middle East have agreed to help Syria rebuild, except Iran. Assad was a great ally of Iran, practically a proxy state, so Iran has little reason to help the new government politically.
Saudi Arabia is helping to gain another ally against Iran and to support general economic development and possibly create a buffer against Israel in case of future attacks.
So that’s pretty much where we are now.
Adam Watson (11:35)
All right, before we go, I want to dive into how Assad fell so quickly—a brief timeline of how the rebels were able to defeat him because they were stuck in a little pocket up north on the Turkish border, right?
There were a couple of reasons. First, like we said, Russia was pretty distracted by—
Nicholas Perrin (11:54)
Yeah.
Adam Watson (12:01)
—the war in Ukraine. Second, Iran and its proxies supported the Assad regime for a while. Its proxies included Hezbollah. But as a result of the conflict between Israel and Hamas and, to a degree, Iran—not really Hezbollah anymore since the Pager incident—Israel basically decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership. That distracted Iran enough that it couldn’t provide the necessary support to Assad.
So he lost his two big allies, Russia and Iran.
Also, his military was brutally underpaid and under-equipped. The average soldier was getting $10 a month from the government. The average officer got $20. They were poorly equipped.
When they saw the rebel forces equipped by Turkey—with night vision, infrared, the latest weapons, matching uniforms—they looked much more professional than the Syrian government forces.
I was watching an interview with someone in the U.S. intelligence apparatus. They knew the Syrian regime was brittle; they just didn’t know how hard a punch it would take to break it apart.
This came as a surprise to basically everybody, especially the U.S., because they had not been watching Syria, expecting Assad’s regime to fall.
Nicholas, do you think there are any more reasons it fell?
Nicholas Perrin (14:08)
Alongside the low pay, morale among Syrian soldiers was extremely low. I assume they knew they weren’t really fighting for a good cause. Maybe they just knew things would be better.
Adam Watson (14:34)
It’s hard to say. Some might have genuinely believed in Assad. Some might have believed in the Syrian state and didn’t want to abandon it. Maybe some were afraid of what would happen to them or their families if they defected. Who’s to say?
Nicholas Perrin (14:57)
Yeah.
Adam Watson (14:58)
OK, a little footnote before we go.
Trump signed an executive order directing the Justice Department to investigate people who burn the American flag. In a 1989 Supreme Court case, the court ruled that the First Amendment protected symbolic speech, including flag burning. But Trump’s order tries to go around that by saying federal prosecutors should prioritize cases where flag burning violates other content-neutral laws.
Basically, he said the high court didn’t rule out charges if flag burning is likely to incite imminent lawless action or amounts to fighting words.
Shortly after this, a 54-year-old veteran who served in the Middle East, Jay Carey of North Carolina, burned an American flag in front of the White House. He was arrested and is facing two misdemeanor counts.
Nicholas, what do you think?
Nicholas Perrin (16:44)
In my opinion, it’s just another media grab by him. His plan is to make Democrats defend a controversial subject and then try to reap the benefit while putting his name in the spotlight more. He doesn’t care.
Adam Watson (17:04)
All right, thank you for listening to “Simplifying the State.” We’ll be back next week with our next episode, so stay tuned.
Like we said, make sure to follow the show, rate it, and share it with a friend, family member, or anyone who would enjoy it. We’ll talk to you next time.
