Two Centuries of Afghanistan History

Afghanistan is a largely mountainous country landlocked in a cramped position at the crossroads of Central and South Asia. The nation shares a similar area to Texas, but to call Afghanistan a nation may be somewhat forgiving of its various communities. Afghanistan has many ethnic groups which include the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaqs, and other ethnic minorities, many of whom wouldn’t believe in an identity as so-called “Afghans,” but rather their own respective ethnicities. With these ethnic differences, there has never been a concrete national identity in Afghanistan.

For most of its history, Afghanistan consisted of loose agreements between those previously-mentioned ethnic groups and an authority based in the national capital of Kabul, most often a shah or king, an emir, or just some nobleman in general. In exchange for relative autonomy and the ability to live their traditional way of life, these ethnic groups would give their support to whoever would preside over the national government in Kabul. This meant that whoever would govern the country would have to walk on eggshells to respect the boundaries drawn by tribal Afghans, many of whom live in almost-secluded mountainous rural communities and fiercely abide by their traditional customs.

These divisions aren’t just ethnic, but they also consist of clan divisions that vie to keep their ancestral property. What established Afghanistan as having the semblance of a nation was during the Anglo-Afghan Wars between 1838 and 1921.

Afghanistan was entangled in a rivalry between the British and Russian Empires in the 19th century in what was called “the Great Game,” where Afghanistan became sovereign as it successfully resisted subjugation and made truce agreements with the two empires.

In 1933, Zahir Shah of the Pashtun “Barakzai” family became the king of Afghanistan, bringing stability to the country for the next 40 years of his reign, during which he extended the nation’s diplomatic relations and made efforts towards modernity, creating a constitutional monarchy system.

The following year, in 1934, the United States formally recognized the government of Afghanistan. However, this prolonged period of peace was not to last.

In 1973, Mohammad Daoud Khan, pro-Soviet general and cousin of Zahir Shah, staged a coup, overthrowing the monarchy to establish Afghanistan as a republic. Khan was originally the Afghan Prime Minister from 1953-1963, until he fell out with his cousin. At first he tried to appease both American and Soviet interests, but border disputes with the US-aligned Pakistan pushed his government closer to the Soviet Union. During his leadership as prime minister, Khan carried out progressive social and educational reforms, which included extending opportunities for women in higher education and the public sphere.

These social reforms were controversial among many Afghans, especially those who lived in rural regions, because it violated their fiercely traditional norms that emphasized the leadership of men. Afghanistan’s new pro-Soviet policy at once attracted the attention of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. The nations became close allies, drastically increasing Cold War tensions with the U.S. During the Cold War the Soviet Union had a significant desire to spread influence and ascertain the loyalty of potential allies.

According to Dr. Paul Hoelscher, Clayton High School AP World History teacher and Social Studies Coordinator for the School District of Clayton, “Throughout the 70s, the Soviet Union increasingly became involved in making sure there was a government that was loyal to them or that they felt would provide a little bit of a geo-political buffer or ally during the Cold War.”

The Afghan Communist Party began to secretly emerge in the mid-1960s, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who would later become president. In 1978, President Daoud was overthrown and murdered in a coup led by a group of pro-communist rebels. Taraki then took his place as president, with principal leader Babrak Karmal as deputy prime minister. Together they formed an Afghanistan based on Islamic principles and socioeconomic justice, while continuing President Daoud’s reforms, albeit with significantly more political repression.

In June of 1978 the rebel group known as the Mujahideen emerged to fight back against the social changes supported by former president Mohammad Daoud Khan. To contribute to their efforts against the Soviet-backed government, the U.S. offered the Mujahideen extensive funds and foreign military support by funneling the support through nearby Pakistan and their intelligence organization. The Soviet Union grew anxious about the growing power of the rebels in the region, worrying that uprisings would weaken the integrity of the government. They were also worried by the growing disregard the Afghan Communist government under Taraki had when it came to how unpopular the Kabul government was getting in rural provinces.

In 1979, American Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs was murdered, causing the U.S. to withdraw assistance to Afghanistan. On December 24, the USSR invaded Afghanistan in an ill-fated attempt to revive the failing pro-Soviet government after assassinating and replacing Taraki’s government with Babrak Kamal as president.

What ensued was a 10-year proxy war between the U.S. and the USSR, which resulted in the death of more than 15,000 Soviet soldiers. Interference in Afghanistan proved to be a continual burden on the Soviet economy, and in 1988 the USSR withdrew their forces. Although the Mujahideen had made significant progress, Soviet influence still dominated, and the battle continued against the current president at the time, Mohammad Najibullah until his government collapsed in 1992 as Soviet military supplies dwindled.

After experiencing years of famine, poverty, and war, the Afghan people were eager for a return to the peace and stability the nation enjoyed under Zahir Shah but to no avail. Without a common Afghan national identity, to form a central government for all Afghans is one that’s bitterly contested among all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups. This common frustration combined with a power vacuum in Kabul created an ideal environment for a new Islamic militia, the Taliban, to rise to power

Hoelscher explained, “The Taliban comes out of youthful movements in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. After the Soviet withdrawal there was chaos, just anarchy and total destruction… For [the U.S.], just a tie was a victory. We weren’t worried about the casualties or the destruction, we were just trying to limit the power of the Soviet Union.”

The Taliban’s name means “students” in the Afghan language of Pashto.

The Soviet withdrawal left Afghanistan devastated, and today many Americans wonder whether the U.S. should have provided more aid to ensure the country’s stability before leaving.

“A lot of people are looking back at the 1990s asking if we should have done more for the people that were our allies or should we have done more to economically stabilize Afghanistan,” said Hoelscher. “And it’s hard in hindsight, but we look back and say that out of that chaos and out of that turmoil, when the Soviets withdrew it was the perfect recipe for the Taliban to come to power.”Afghanistan in the early 1990s lacked a solid infrastructure network, and the Taliban had given many people the hope that their country would experience a return to security and traditional Islamic values. While the Taliban did enforce laws to tackle crime and the sale of drugs, the country’s new Sharia law significantly limited women’s education and employment and demanded a strict adherence to gender norms. Women were required to be fully veiled outside their homes and remain in the company of a partner or guardian, and laws were further enforced by public floggings and executions. Since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August of this year, the group’s promises to protect women’s rights have largely been unfulfilled. As of now there is still great uncertainty whether the Taliban’s attempts to legitimize and moderate their government will be successful.

As Dr. Hoelscher sees the situation, “They might try to legitimize their role, but there is still likely to be more repression of women and political censorship.”

During the 1970s and 80s, Osama bin Laden, the 17th child of a millionaire construction magnate, began providing the Mujahideen rebels with funds, weapons, and fighters. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, bin Laden created the Sunni militant organization Al Qaeda for the purpose of fighting future holy wars globally.

Before the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, few Americans knew about Al Qaeda at all, much less the extent its activities would have on the lives of millions of people across the world. On December 19, 1992, Al Qaeda carried out its first attack in Aden, Yemen. In 1993, the first attack on the World trade Center occured, led by Ramzi Yousef, a Pakistani terrorist that had trained in Al-Qaeda’s camps. In 1998, Al-Qaeda operatives carried out bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 and unjuring more than 5,000 others.

On September 11th, 19 men hijacked four commercial airliners, crashing two of them into the upper floors of the south and north towers of the World trade Center. Today the 9/11 attacks stand as the most deadly and traumatic terrorist attacks to ever occur in the United States, resulting in 3,000 deaths, 25,000 injuries, and billions of dollars worth of damages in infrastructure.

On October 7, an intense bombing campaign led by American and British forces began, targeting Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan as part of the United States’ “war on terror,” a response to the devastating events of 9/11. According to Hoelscher, the alliance between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is the greatest concern of the U.S., as it poses the greatest threat to national security.

“The problem is, they allowed groups, Al-Qaeda being the most famous, to be there and train there. So a question from the 90s that is very pertinent today is, what were the relationships between Al-Qaeda, which we know as an international terrorist organization, and the government of the Taliban. To what degree did they work together? To what degree did the Taliban government feel like it needed to house or protect or allow Al-Qaeda to be there, to legitimize their rule at the time?”

As US and NATO’s forces drove out and nested in Afghanistan’s major cities in 2001, a nation-building project was started where a new US-backed government was propped from Kabul. Although NATO forces were able to crush most of Al-Qaeda’s forces and later kill Osama bin-Laden, the challenge of stifling the Taliban that captured the hearts of many rural Afghans while also leaving behind a stable and functional government in Afghanistan ended up becoming the main objective of the US and NATO. The US-backed government was rife with corruption and embezzlement by government officials, while also facing issues with collateral damage where the US Air Force would kill civilians in airstrikes as a result of poor intelligence. Chief Foreign-Affairs Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, Yaroslav Trofimov, reported that in a survey of 15-30 year old men in two southern Afghan provinces, 92% of respondents said they didn’t know about “this event which foreigners call 9/11” even after they were given a three-paragraph description of the attacks. Many Afghans didn’t even know the reason why their country was invaded.

Combined with the corruption and the embezzlement of foreign funds, the incompetence of Afghan leaders to lead the country without their hands being held by their foreign allies militarily, and increasing pessimism with the length of the war led to many Afghans being torn over the war and the militaries that promised to protect them. And meanwhile on the US homefront, public opinion for the war—overwhelmingly positive at first in the aftermath of 9/11—slumped as many Americans reasoned that the length of the war as America’s longest war points to why US forces should withdraw from the war torn country.

In many ways, the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan mirrors other major geopolitical conflicts such as the Vietnam War, which increasingly lost the support of the American people as efforts to prevent the spread of communism proved a fruitless endeavor. Throughout its history, the United States has struggled to find a balance between intervention and non-interventionism; and when it comes to international affairs, many Americans are left wondering, at what point do foreign conflicts merit attention and supplies? What ideological battles is the U.S. willing to fight?

As Hoelscher said, “The pragmatic capacity [for intervention] has to be balanced with the ideological mission.”